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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
GORDON RAY HAM
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Gordon Ray Ham ("Mr. Ham") brings this appeal from
the decision of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) and Utah R. Crim P. 26(2) (a) (1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW (R. 55-60)
The issues presented on this appeal are the following:
1.

Did the lower court err when it determined state and

federal constitutional rights were not violated when agents of the
Utah Department of Corrections searched Mr. Ham f s residence without
the requisite "reasonable suspicion" that Mr. Ham had violated or
was currently violating a condition of his probation or any state,

local, or federal law.
2.

Did the lower court err when it determined agents were

authorized

by

Mr.

Ham's

probation

agreement

to

search

his

refrigerator and, by implication, the separate freezer; and does
any alleged probation agreement supersede a probationer's state and
federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.
3.

Did the lower court err when it determined that Mr. Ham

voluntarily consented to the search of his refrigerator, analyzed
under state and federal constitutional standards.
4.

Did the lower court err when it determined that any

contraband

found

downstairs

was

not

illegally

seized

because

Mr.Ham, after being placed under arrest, was not advised of his
rights per Miranda before the officers interrogated him, which led
to officers obtaining incriminating statements and evidence.
B.

Standards of Review

1.

Utah Law
The standard of review under Utah law is a correction of error

standard and the trial court's factual findings will not be set
aside unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d
1037, 1040

(Utah App. 1993)

(citing State v. Thurman, 846 P. 2d

1256, 1271 (Utah 1993).
2.

Federal Law
Pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Thurman, the

same standard of review is applied to federal law.

See 846 P.2d at

1266-67 ("[T]he standard of review is a question to be determined
2

by the law of the forum performing the appellate review.").
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 1 4 .
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a)

Nature of the Case.
This appeal is from entry of judgment and conviction by the

Honorable David S. Young, Judge of the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
(b)

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.
On or about October

charged with Unlawful
Intent

to

Distribute,

19, 1994, Mr. Ham,

a probationer,

Possession of a Controlled
a

Second

Degree

Felony,

Substance
and

was
With

Unlawful

Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony.

The

case was assigned to Judge David S. Young and on or about the 10th
day of November, 1994, Mr. Ham filed a Motion To Suppress Evidence
seized on October 13, 1994, from Mr. Ham's residence.

Seven days

later, on the 17th day of November, 1994, an evidentiary hearing on
Mr. Ham's suppression motion was held.
3

Mr. Ham's motion was denied

in its entirety on or about the 22nd day of November, 1994.
As

a

result

of

Judge

Young1s

November

22nd

ruling,

an

agreement was reached whereby the State would drop the Third Degree
Felony charge in exchange for Mr. Ham's entry of a conditional plea
of guilty to the Second Degree Felony.

On December 12, 1994,

pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), Mr. Ham
entered

a Conditional-Change-Of-Plea

to one

count of

Unlawful

Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a
Second Degree Felony.
Following completion of a presentence report, Mr. Ham was
sentenced on January 23, 1995, to a term of one to fifteen years at
the Utah State Prison and was taken away forthwith.

Mr. Ham filed

his Notice of Appeal on that same day, January 23, 1995.

On or

about the 17th day of February, 1995, Mr. Ham filed an Application
For Issuance Of A Certificate Of Probable Cause which, following a
hearing on the Application, was granted by Judge David S. Young on
the 9th day of March, 1995, and Mr. Ham was ordered released from
the Utah State Prison pending the current appeal.
However, as a result of Mr. Ham's status as a probationer at
the time of the events giving rise to the charges addressed in
Judge

Young's

court, Mr. Ham's probation

was

revoked

by

the

Honorable Anne M. Stirba, District Court Judge, and Mr. Ham remains
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison.

Thus far, Mr. Ham has

decided against an appeal of Judge Stirba1s revocation ruling,
although this ruling is directly and equally applicable to the
issues being raised in the current appeal.
4

(c)

Statement of Material Facts,
On or about the 8th day of March, 1993, Mr. Ham entered a plea

of guilty

to two counts of Sexual Assault, both Third Degree

Felonies, and was sentenced to three years probation under the
supervision of the Adult Probation & Parole division of the Utah
Department of Corrections.
events

giving

rise

to

Mr. Ham was on probation at the time

the

underlying

charges

in

this

matter

occurred.
On October 13, 1994, at approximately 3:50 p.m, Agents Scott
A. McCullough and Craig Hillam, probation officers for the Utah
Department of Corrections

(UDC) , went

to 8625 South 150 West,

Midvale, Utah, Mr. Ham's residence, to conduct a "routine home
visit."

When the agents arrived at Mr. Ham ! s residence, they were

greeted at the door by a guest of Mr. Ham's, who notified Mr. Ham
that he had company.
Mr. Ham came up from the downstairs area of his residence and
greeted the agents, who by this time were standing just inside the
front door of his residence.

Agents McCullough and Hillam then

held a very brief conversation with Mr. Ham regarding how he was
doing with his therapy and other things in general.

At some point

during this brief conversation, Agent McCullough told Mr. Ham that
he was going to do an alcohol check and that he "needed" to look in
Mr. Ham's refrigerator.

At no point in time did Agent McCullough

or Agent Hillam specifically ask Mr. Ham for his permission to look
in the refrigerator, or for that matter, any other area of the
residence.
5

Based upon Agent McCullough1s authoritative statement that he
was going to look in the refrigerator, Mr. Ham walked into the
kitchen area, opened the refrigerator door and offered each of the
agents a soda pop.
kitchen

area

refrigerator.
Ham's kitchen.

and

Agent McCullough followed Mr. Ham into the
proceeded

to

examine

the

contents

of

the

Agent Hillam then walked into another area of Mr.
Mr. Ham returned to the living room area of his

residence while Agent McCullough was searching the refrigerator.
Some three to four feet away from the refrigerator was a
closed, free-standing and entirely separate freezer unit.

The

freezer was located next to a wall that was perpendicular to the
refrigerator's location.

Without making a request or comment of

any kind, Agent Hillam opened the closed freezer unit and began a
thorough examination of its contents.

During this search, Agent

Hillam located two nearly empty bottles of alcoholic beverages
commonly used as mixers.
Agent Hillam poured the contents of these bottles down the
sink, and Agent McCullough

informed Mr. Ham the liquor was a

violation of his probation. Agent McCullough then informed Mr. Ham
that they were going to examine the rest of Mr. Ham's residence and
told Mr. Ham to accompany them while they continued the search.
The agents then began a cursory search of the up-stairs portion of
Mr. Ham's residence. Upon finding no other incriminating evidence,
the agents began a more intensive search and discovered a couple of
empty beer cans and some pornographic tapes.

The agents then

directed Mr. Ham to accompany them downstairs where they continued
6

their search of his residence.
Once downstairs, Mr. Ham instructed the agents on how to turn
on the lights whereupon Agent McCullough located a cooler, opened
it, and discovered approximately 14 cans of beer on ice.

Agent

Hillam went to an adjacent area of the basement, which was a type
of storage area, and asked Mr. Ham how to operate the lights in
that area.

Mr. Ham informed Agent Hillam how to turn on the light;

thereafter, Agent Hillam observed a large framed mirror with a
white powdery substance on it.

He also observed a razor blade,

straw, various miscellaneous items, and a plastic bag containing a
quantity of pills.
Agent Hillam returned to the area where Mr. Ham was located
and placed him under arrest, although neither Agent Hillam nor
Agent

McCullough

advised

Mr.

Ham

of

his

rights

per

Miranda.

Thereafter, without his Miranda rights having been given, Agent
Hillam and Agent McCullough began interrogating Mr. Ham about
whether there was anything else in the basement they should know
about.

In response, Mr. Ham disclosed to the agents that there was

some cocaine in a large locked box under the stairs.
informed them that the key to the lock was in his pocket.

He also
Unable

to retrieve the key from his own pocket, because his hands were
cuffed, one of the agents retrieved the key and unlocked the large
box whereupon Agent McCullough found the additional cocaine Mr. Ham
had identified.
The agents then told Mr. Ham he had better tell them about
anything else that may be in the basement.
7

Mr. Ham responded by

telling

the

agents

that

they

could

find

a small

quantity of

mushrooms in a cup on one of the shelves in the basement.

The

agents located the mushrooms where Mr. Ham said they would be.
Thereafter,

one

of

the

agents

Department to request back-up.

contacted

the

Midvale

Police

It was during this wait, and after

incriminating statements were made and evidence discovered, that
Agent Hillam finally advised Mr. Ham of his rights per Miranda.
Agent McCullough then telephoned Debbie Kemp, another agent of
UDC

and

Mr. Ham's

recently

assigned

probation

agent.

Agent

McCullough requested that Agent Kemp bring a field evidence kit to
the scene and, upon Agent Kemp's arrival, the substances located
during the search of Mr. Ham's residence were tested.

After the

testing was concluded, Mr. Ham was transported to the Salt Lake
County Jail facility.

Mr. Ham is presently incarcerated at the

Utah State Prison.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
An individual does not forfeit all constitutional rights to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures simply because that
individual happens to be on probation.
probationer

retains

constitutional

Although diminished, a

protections

under

the

4th

amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under Article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution.
As advanced by both state and federal interpretation, this
diminished

protection

still

requires

at

least

a

"reasonable

suspicion" of wrongdoing before a warrantless and non-consensual
search of a probationer's property can be conducted.
8

In the

present case, there was no suspicion of any type that Mr. Ham was
doing anything inappropriate, there was no warrant to conduct a
search, and Mr. Ham did not consent to a search of his residence.
The search of Mr. Ham's residence was therefore constitutionally
inappropriate.
Without
conduct,

a

even

warrant

or

Corrections

"reasonable
agents

are

suspicion"

required

of

illegal

to procure

the

knowing, voluntary and unambiguous consent of a probationer before
they conduct a search of the probationer's private property.

At

the very minimum, this requires a direct and unambiguous request
for permission to conduct

a search and an equally direct and

unambiguous affirmative response to the search request.

In the

present case, Mr. Ham was never asked if a search of his residence
could be conducted and Mr. Ham never told agents they could search
his

residence;

at

best,

Mr.

Ham

merely

acquiesced

authoritative and coercive conduct of the agents.

in

the

Failure to even

attempt to procure Mr. Ham's consent for their search made the
agent's conduct illegal under both state and federal constitutions.
Even if Mr. Ham's conduct could be interpreted as consent for
the agents to look in the refrigerator, which is the only area
specifically addressed by the agents, a constitutionally valid
search is only valid to the extent specifically identified as the
area and/or item to be searched.

When the agents went beyond the

refrigerator in the course of their search, they exceeded the scope
of any alleged consent to the search and were therefore violating
Mr. Ham's right to be free from unwarranted intrusions into his
9

privacy.
It was only as a result of the illegal search of Mr. Ham's
freezer that agents began a more thorough search of his residence
and all further evidence gathered, whether physical or verbal, were
discovered as a direct result of the agents' exploitation of the
prior illegality.

Without the appropriate warrant, "reasonable

suspicion" or consent, all evidence gathered at Mr. Ham's residence
on October 13, 1994, should have been suppressed as "fruits of the
poisonous tree."
Finally, advising an arrested individual of their rights per
Miranda after interrogation and the accumulation of evidence cannot
dissipate the taint of the initial illegality.

In the present

case, Mr. Ham's residence was unlawfully searched, Mr. Ham was
arrested, interrogated, and additional searches were conducted, and
only after the evidence had been gathered was Mr. Ham provided
notice of his rights per Miranda.

Agents of the Department of

Corrections are trained in search and seizure areas of the law and
they are just as accountable to the constitutional protections of
our society as are police officers.
In the present case, agents of the Department of Corrections
unilaterally determined their authority was superior to Mr. Ham's
constitutional protections.
inappropriate

determination

appropriately addressed.

That was an unlawful and
on

the

agents'

part

and

totally
must

be

This Court must reverse the decision of

the lower court and reiterate to the Department of Corrections that
even they are subject to the constitution;
10

probationers do retain

constitutional rights that must be protected, not abridged.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE AGENTS LACKED A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT MR. HAM WAS
VIOLATING THE TERMS OF HIS PROBATION, RENDERING THE NONCONSENSUAL SEARCH OF HIS RESIDENCE ILLEGAL.
In the landmark case of State v. Velasquez, 672 P. 2d 1254

(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed and
affirmed the rights of a parolee to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the fourth amendment.1

In Velasquez,

a parolee was suspected of selling drugs, based on an informant's
tip

and

the

fact

legitimate income.

that

the parolee

had no

apparent

means of

Based on this information, parole officers

executed a warrantless search of the parolee's residence, finding
incriminating evidence against Velasquez, the parolee's room-mate,
who also happened to be on parole.
Velasquez moved the Court to suppress the evidence seized in
the warrantless search and the lower court declined, finding that
the agents performing the search had a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity or a parole violation.

672 P.2d at 1261 n.6.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed that the lower court had applied
the correct standard, stating "[t]hus, although a warrant based on
probable cause is not generally required, a parole officer must
have reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has
violated the terms of his parole or committed a crime."
at 1260 (emphasis added).

672 P.2d

The Court further concluded that the

1

See also.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
(The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
applies to probationers).
11

parole

officers possessed

articulable

facts giving

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

rise

to a

Id. at 1262.

While Velasquez treats searches upon parolees, the Court noted
that

"[i]n

determining

whether

the

constitutional

protection

against unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated, some
courts have held that the rights of parolees and probationers are
legally indistinguishable."

Id. at 1258 n.2.

Then, in State v.

Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah App. 1991), this Court adopted
the

"reasonable

suspicion"

standard

in the probation context.

Therefore, the "reasonable suspicion" standard as set forth in
Velasquez is indeed applicable to probationers as well as parolees.
In the present case, Mr. Ham was on probation at the time of
the agents search.

Mr. Ham had signed a probation

agreement

entitling "an agent of the Department of Corrections to search
[his] person, residence, vehicle or any other property under [his]
control, without a warrant, any time day or night, upon reasonable
suspicion

as

ascertained
ensure

by

an

agent

compliance

of

with

the
the

Department

of

conditions

of

Corrections

to

probation."2

Thus, even Mr. Ham's Probation Agreement sets forth

Mr. Ham's right to be free from searches that are not based at
least upon a reasonable suspicion of a violation of the "conditions
of probation."
2

Id.3

Clause 8 of Mr. Ham's Probation Agreement. (See Addendum

#2)
3

Velasquez further affirms that the probation agreement
cannot constitute a waiver of constitutional rights but "merely
parallels, by way of confirmation, the right of the parole officer
. . . to conduct searches rationally and substantially related to
12

The reasonable suspicion requirement has been elucidated as
follows:
Less stringent a standard than probable cause, reasonable
.suspicion requires no more than that the authority acting
be able to point to specific and articulabel facts that,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant a belief in the conclusion mooted--in
this instance, that a condition of parole has been or is
being violated.
Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1260 n.5.

Therefore, in the present case,

Agents McCullough and Hillam were not authorized to search any
portion of Mr. Ham's residence unless they are able to "point to
specific and articulable facts" warranting a belief that Mr. Ham
was violating his probation.

However, at the time the agents began.

their search, they lacked any suspicious facts or circumstances
entitling them to examine anything but the "plain view" area of Mr.
Ham's residence. (R.119, 139).
When the agents first arrived in the home, they stated their
intent to "look in the fridge for alcohol." (R.123). Although this
demand was advanced as an official duty, the agents were not
authorized by the Probation Agreement to conduct alcohol checks
without reasonable suspicion of at least some form of
activity on Mr. Ham's part.4

illegal

From the moment the Agents notified

Mr. Ham they were going to search his residence, as opposed to
requesting permission to search, the Agents were conducting an
illegal invasion of Mr. Ham's privacy and the fruits of their
the performance of his duty."
672 P. 2d at 1260, n.4
People v. Huntley, 371 N.E. 2d 794 (1977) .
4

(quoting

And, even if it did, the Constitution would prohibit such
a practice. See e.g., Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1260 n.4.
13

illegal activity should have been suppressed by the lower court.
II.

THE AGENTS DID NOT OBTAIN OR EVEN SEEK MR. HAM'S CONSENT
TO SEARCH HIS REFRIGERATOR, FREEZER, OR ANY OTHER PORTION
OF MR. HAM'S RESIDENCE.
A

search

premised

on

voluntary

consent

is

one

of

the

exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g.,

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

Under Utah law, it is the State's burden to prove consent and it
must

"present proof

voluntarily granted."

that consent

to search was knowingly and

State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah

App. 1991) . Additionally, under federal law, "the voluntariness of
consent must be determined from the totality of the circumstances,
and the government bears the burden of proof on the issue." United
States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d

1553, 1557

(10th Cir. 1993)

(quoting

United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548 (10th Cir. 1993)).
A.

The State Failed To Establish Constitutionally Valid Consent
Was Given By Mr. Ham To Search Any Portion Of His Residence.
In the present case, the State failed to prove that Mr. Ham

"knowingly
residence.

and

voluntarily"

consented

to

The standard Utah has adopted

any

search

of

his

for determining the

"voluntariness" of consent is as follows:
In order for consent to be voluntary, (1) there must be
clear and positive testimony that the consent was
unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently
given; (2) the government must prove consent was given
without duress or coercion, express or implied; (3) the
court must indulge every reasonable presumption against
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993) .

(Citing

State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990), afffd, 853 P.2d
14

898 (1993)).

Similarly, under federal standards "the government

must show that there was no duress or coercion, express or implied,
that the consent was unequivocal and specific, and that it was
freely and intelligently given."

Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557.

Neither

the Utah standards or the federal standards were met in the present
case.
During direct examination, Agent Scott McCullough testified as
follows:
* * *

Q.

How did he respond to your statement that you needed to
go in the refrigerator for alcohol?

A.

Did not respond.
I do not remember any particular
conversation, exactly what was said, that he did not have
any objection, and I believe he said go ahead, but I do
not recall specifically.

(R.123-24).

(Emphasis added).
* * *

Q.

Did he make any verbal response at all to you when you
told him you needed to look in the refrigerator?

A.

I do not recall a specific response.
cooperative during the entire time.

Q.

I want you to focus on this particular point in time.

A.

I do not remember particularly what was said, no, but
there--! know that there was nothing negatively to us
looking in the fridge.

(R.124-25).
Clearly,

Mr. Ham was fully

(Emphasis added).
Agent

McCullough's

testimony,

i.e.,

"I

do

not

remember any particular conversation," and "I believe he said go
ahead, but I do not recall specifically, " does not satisfy the
State's burden.

This is because "there must be clear and positive
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search.

The

initial

search

of

Mr.

Ham's

residence

was

unconstitutionally performed, and the subsequent "more thorough"
search remains likewise unconstitutional.
B.

If Consent Was Given, The Consent Was Specifically For The
Refrigerator And Any Extension Of The Search Went Beyond The
Scope Of The Consent.
If we assume, for arguments' sake, that consent to search Mr.

Ham's refrigerator was given, there remains an issue regarding the
scope of the search which must be addressed.

With respect to the

scope of consent, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[e]ven when
a constitutionally valid consent is given, the scope of the ensuing
search must be limited to the scope of the consent, and police
activity that exceeds the scope of the consent violates the Fourth
Amendment."

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1218 (Utah 1993) (citing

Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04 (1991)).

"The scope of

the search is generally defined by its expressed object."

Jimeno,

111 S. Ct. at 1804 (emphasis added).
The

testimony

shows

that

there

was

never

a

request

or

discussion regarding a "need" to look in the adjacent freezer and
no consent was ever given by Mr. Ham for the search of the freezer.
(R.125) . Assuming for the purposes of this discussion that Mr. Ham
arguably consented to the search of the refrigerator, there is no
"clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal,
specific, and freely and intelligently given" with respect to the
freezer.

Even assuming

that there was consent

to search the

refrigerator, "the scope of the ensuing search must be limited to
the scope of the consent [i.e., the refrigerator] ." Dunn, 850 P. 2d
17
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III. EXCLUDING THE FRUITS OF THE ILLEGAL SEARCH CONDUCTED BY THE
PROBATION OFFICERS IN THE PRESENT CASE IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE
AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DETERRING FUTURE VIOLATIONS ~>~ THTS
SAME NATURE.
The exclusionary r-. .

s "prime purpose is t-o deter future

i - awful police c >ndi. :t and thereby effeccuave the auarantee -f the
Fourth Amendment

-ITI--:'"1-

rrrvrr'.Mr search

States v. Calandra,
deter • t

d^sre^ai, ^
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u.pose is rc

compel reupec?

only effectively

i

!

Vr \

t .i t,.1 • constitutional guaranty ^-; *
-

"

- Calandra Coui;

»

"
. _*, 0 ^«t^.

As with any remedial device, the application of the rule
has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The
balancing process implicit in this approach is expressed
t-he contours of the standing requirement.
Thus,
iiiuing to invoke the exclusionary rule has "been
confined to situations where the Government seeks to use
such evidence to incriminate the victim of the -ml awful
search.
[Citations omitted].
This standing rule is
premised on a recognition that the need for deterrence
and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are
strongest where the Government's unlawful conduct would
result in imposition of a criminal sanction of the victim
of the search.
Citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206# 217 (1960)
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414 U.S. at 348.
The officers who searched Mr. Ham's residence on October 13,
1994,

apparently

had

no

incentive

to

recognize

Mr.

Ham's

constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and they
therefore disregarded Mr. Ham's rights.

The only

"effectively

available way" to deter similar transgressions in the future is to
exclude such illegally obtained evidence when it is gathered.

The

exclusionary rule was adopted to realize the Fourth Amendment right
of all citizens "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . "

Under

this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
cannot be used in a proceeding against the victim of the illegal
search and seizure. United States v. Winsett. 518 F.2d 51, 53 (9th
Cir. 1975) .6

Even Mr. Ham, a probationer, has Fourth Amendment

rights to be free from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy,
especially in his own home.7
Agents

McCullough

and

Hillam

of

the

Utah

Department

of

Corrections utilized improper techniques to obtain authority to
search

Mr.

contravention

Ham's
to

seizure procedural

residence,
federal

and

techniques
state

safeguards.

The

that

are

constitutional
agents

in

direct

search

entered Mr.

and

Ham's

residence announcing and embracing an authority that Probation
Officers simply do not posses.

In light of the experience levels

6

See e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7

See, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); State v.
Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983).
19

of these agents, iu it* xeaaonajjle to presume each knew that to
conduct a legal search of any part ^

Mv

~

uqmto

residence, the

agents were required to possess a "reasonable susi/J rioi."
Ham wa: -*
been

i h.»i '

»

VJO;U;

a;y a 3 La- <.., iocai, 01 a tedeiai

Inasmuch as the agents were at Mr. Ham': residence to conduct
what thev r°frequisite !':cabOiiabx* ouspiciuii,
of Mr

ac subduquciil oedich oi any part

Ham's residence was tainted from t lie

H a m

nitial demand for
.*-.-•

acquiescence and his lailuie iu specifically object io Llie ayeutb
initial conduct was sufficient t_r, infer "voluntary consent" for th^
*:

SPS

propositi^!.

Lii.:, •

Certainly there

broadei

"onsent

:F

wen"

* t-yunu

Lut,- refrigejrj;.. .

rationale, under either state

J , ocopt- : i. .:.

area

specifically

federal

identified

by tne

probation officers., 1 : e . . r :,^ c o n t p ^ p ^f t-h^ refrigerator.
B
from

and unrelated

\o

tn*. 1 ef r lgeratoi , ; 1 which

the a.leqec

"consent" had been obtai n.ed# the officers exceeded the scope of an\a

.

i«'i in, 1 I I y

n i 1. jjuj in

exploKdliuri ui i .:*-,- i .iLidi illegality; M r . Ham, after being placed
under arrest., was not advised of iiis rights per Miranda before the
8

See, State v. Velasquez, G'U r.2d
the standard language found ' "lause .•
Agi eement.
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254 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) ; and
"•'. • :-:aa,s Probation

officers

further

interrogated

him,

incriminating statements and evidence.

which

led

to

additional

(R.163-68).

We cannot assume that the Miranda Court envisioned that law
enforcement

officials

could

simply

ignore

those

procedural

safeguards, then obtain incriminating statements and evidence under
the guise that the evidence would have been found anyway or that
simply giving the Miranda notice was, in and of itself, sufficient
to dissipate any taint generated by any prior illegality.
IV.

THE EVENTUAL NOTICE OF MR. HAM'S RIGHTS PER MIRANDA DID
NOT DISSIPATE THE TAINT OF THE INITIAL AND ONGOING
ILLEGALITY PERPETRATED BY THE AGENTS IN CONDUCTING THEIR
UNAUTHORIZED SEARCH OF MR. HAM'S RESIDENCE.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently rejected the

proposition

that

"a

search

unlawful

validated by what it turns up."9

at

its

inception

may

be

In other words, all evidence

that would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of
the authorities becomes "fruit of the poisonous tree" unless and
until the authorities can establish that discovery of the evidence
was not through exploitation of the illegality.10
the

Court,

the appropriate

question

to consider

As advanced by
is

"whether,

granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of
that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint."11

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
Id. at 488.
Id. (Citing Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959).
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criminal
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context,
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the Calandra case described the breadth of the

—•]••-• as follows:

In the usuai context of a criminal trial, the defendant
is entitled to the suppression of, not only the evidence
obtained through an unlawful search and seizure, but also
any derivative use of that evidence. ~" prohibition of
the exclusionary rule must reach sue:. _._iivative use if
it is to fulfill its function oi: deterring police
misconduct. . . . Our conclusion necessarily controls
both the evidence seized during the course of an unlawful
search and seizure and any question or evidence derived
therefrom (the fruits of the unlawful search). The same
considerations of logic and policy apply to both the
fruits of an unlawful search and seizure and derivative
use of that evidence, and we do not distinguish between
them.
414
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-rbc
must

be

suppressed

iiese

agents are experience Probation Officers and are well aware of
their duties and obligations with regard to lawful searches and
seizures.

This Court cannot allow these agents to simply ignore

constitutionally guaranteed rights simply because they unilaterally
determined it was an appropriate thing to do at the time.
CONCLUSION
Under Article I, section 14 of Utah's Constitution, as well as
under the Fourth Amendment
citizens

of

this

state

to the United States Constitution,
and

nation

are

protected

against

unreasonable intrusions by government entities into their privacy.
Under both Utah and United States Supreme Court decisions, the
protection afforded a probationer may be diminished, but it still
requires, at a minimum, an articulable and identifiable suspicion
of wrongdoing before one's privacy rights can be invaded.

As

phrased by the Utah courts, a "reasonable suspicion" is required
before

a

search

can

be

conducted

of

a probationer's

private

property.
Agents of the Department of Corrections, conducting a routine
home visit and having absolutely no suspicions whatsoever, notified
Mr. Ham that they were going to do an alcohol search of Mr. Ham's
residence and they were going to search his refrigerator.

Inasmuch

as Mr. Ham was on probation, and these agents were probation
officers, it is reasonable to anticipate that Mr. Ham would not be
in a position of telling the agents what they could and could not
do.

The agents did not ask, they notified and conducted.

In fact,

with reference to the freezer, they conducted without notification.
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be described as a routine "home visit" at the defendant's residence
at 8625 South 150 West in Midvale, Utah.
In the course of the visit, Scott McCullough said, "We need to
look

in

the

refrigerator

for

alcohol."

Mr.

McCullough's

recollection is that the defendant stated, "Go ahead."

Certainly

there was no denial of permission by the defendant. Mr. McCullough
and Mr. Hillam walked with the defendant into the kitchen.

Mr.

McCullough looked in the refrigerator and Mr. Hillam pulled the
door open to a separate freezer.

All of this was done in the

presence of the defendant and without any apparent objection.
Within the freezer was found two bottles of alcohol.

Mr. Hillam

pulled the bottles out of the freezer. Mr. McCullough advised the
defendant that possession of the alcohol was a violation of the
terms and conditions of his probation agreement, and asked him if
he, Mr. Ham, would lead them through the rest of the residence so
that they could conduct a routine, yet cursory "walk through"
search of the residence.
They were led downstairs where there was an ice chest in which
was found 14 cans of beer on ice. Mr. Hillam asked how to turn the
light on in one of the rooms downstairs.

The defendant told him

that he needed to simply tighten the bulb, which he did.

In plain

view therein, Mr. Hillam found a mirror covered with a white dust

STATE V. HAM
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residue, some razor blades, and some other items that could be used
for snorting cocaine.
this time

The mirror was in plain sight.

It was at

that Mr. Hillam placed Mr. Ham under arrest and

handcuffed him.

Unfortunately, Mr. Hillam did not Mirandize Mr.

Ham at that moment, but asked him other questions.

One question

led to some contraband "mushrooms," which were retrieved.

Mr.

Hillam then Mirandized Mr. Ham, and thereafter Mr. Ham agreed to
speak, and told Mr. Hillam and Mr. McCullough about a locked trunk
under the staircase, bolted to the floor, in which was found
considerable cocaine contraband.
The question in this case is whether the parole officers had
a

contractual right and/or a reasonable basis on which to conduct

the search?
In State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d

1254

(Utah 1983), and

thereafter in State v. Martinez. 811 P.2d 205 (Utah App. 1991) , the
court stated that there must be a "reasonable suspicion" prior to
requiring the obtaining of a warrant for a search.
In this case, the "reasonable suspicion" as to the violation
of Mr. Ham's probation occurred when alcohol was found in his
freezer in the kitchen.

The officers had the right through the

probation agreement and through the permission given by Mr. Ham to
search the refrigerator and by implication, an adjacent freezer
search was appropriate. Thereafter the officers were led through
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the home for a visual search of the remainder of the property. It
was certainly appropriate for the officers to examine the ice chest
in plain sight in the basement wherein they found the 14 cans of
beer on ice.

It was not until the cocaine residue and drug

paraphernalia was found that the officers knew that there was
evidence of serious independent criminal conduct beyond a violation
of the alcohol provision of probation agreement.
The Court finds that immediately after finding the evidence of
cocaine in the darkened room and upon arrest, the Miranda warning
should have been given. However, it was given shortly thereafter,
and the only disclosure made between the time of the initial
observation of cocaine and the giving of the Miranda warning,
resulted in the disclosure by the defendant of the location of the
contraband "mushrooms."
The Court finds that all of the contraband in the home would
reasonably have been discovered through an appropriate search, and
is thus admissible, see Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct.
2501, (1984).

The initial walk through search was conducted in a

non-intrusive way in all respects.

The defendant voluntarily

provided the officers with information as to both the "mushrooms"
and the locked box of cocaine under the stairs.

There can be no

question as to the admissibility of the locked box of cocaine; and,
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the cocaine residue, and other paraphernalia in the darkened room;
but, in addition, the Court finds that the mushrooms would have
been discovered

in an appropriate

search and are thus also

admissible.
The defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied as to each of the
items of evidence.
The State is asked to prepare Findings and an Order consistent
with this Memorandum Decision, and the evidence as presented at the
hearing.
Dated this

_day of November, 1994.

DAVID S. Y O U N G
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Solomon Chacon
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124 South 400 East, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
PROBATION AGREEMENT
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//

agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of
I.
Corrections and to be accountable for my actions and copduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court,
I further agree to abide by ail conditions of probation as ordered by the Court and set forth in this Agreement
consistent with the laws of the State of Utah. I fully understand that Violation of this Agreement and/or any conditions
thereof or any qew conviction for a crime may result \n action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my
probation period to commence again,
,
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
v
* r > 1, I shall report directly to my supervising agent in person by the 5th of each month m » i ulhu-wiatf U l i u u w .
j{^ 2. I shall permit visits to my place of residence, my plac^ of employment oreteewhereas required by the Department
of Corrections for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of probation.
jpt 3. I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at such residence in fact and on record and shall not
change my place of residence without the knowledge of my ^probation agerlt
# # 4 . I shall not leave the State cf Utah without prior written authorization from the Department of Corrections. I agree
and acknowledge that should I leave the State of Utah without prior written authorization from the Department of
Corrections, that I hereby waive extradition proceedings from any jurisdiction in which i may be found.
A$ 5. I shall obey all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at all times. I shall report any arrests or citations to
the Department of Corrections within 72 hours of occurrence.
4if^
I shall not own, possess, or have under my control or in my custody any explosives, firearms, or any dangerous
weaopns in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 921 T et sfeq.; 18 U.S-C. App. § 1201,et seq. or Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501. as amended.
JJr7. I shall abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of
marijuana, narcotics* controlled substances or other drugs as defined in the Controlled ^ubstance Act, Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-2, as amended. I agree to submit to prinalysis or other tests for marijuana, narcotics, controlled substances or other
drugs upon reasonably suspicion as ascertained by and at the request of a probation agent of the Department of
Corrections to ensure compiianqe with this condition of probation.
' . JPFB. f agree to allow an agent of the Department of Corrections to search my person, residence, vehicle or any other
property under my control, without^ warrant any time d i y or night upo,n reasonable suspicion as ascertained by an agent
of the Department of Corrections Ho ensure compliance with the conditions of probation.
Mk 9. I shall not associate with any known Criminal in any manner which can reasonably be expected to result in, or
which has resulted in criminal or illegal activity.
M l O . I shalLsaakHattaiMt^^
,
$ T 1 1 , I shdtl, comply witji the following special conditions^as'orderecf by the Court
. /
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